This article by Chase Lyndale was originally published in the Spring 2026 issue of Verdict Magazine, a publication of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association

Litigators are trained to think of trial as the end goal of every case. Discovery, by contrast, is often treated as a procedural phase to be endured on the way to trial. In practice, however, the most decisive battle may occur long before opening statements. This article discusses a recent wrongful death product liability and negligence case handled by my firm, Cannella Snyder, that illustrates how important it is to fight those discovery battles. 

Although we alleged their conduct caused our client’s death, the defendants claimed they intended to file an early motion for summary judgment based on what they described asa dispositive legal defense. Given that, as well as the complexity of the case and a variety of other factors, the case was unlikely to settle early. 

During discovery, we requested documents to assess the defendants’ corporate structure and potential misuse of the corporate form. In response, the defendants produced an inter company loan agreement. The document was undated. It was signed by the same individual on behalf of multiple corporate entities. It included only the named defendants, despite the broader corporate family extending well beyond those entities. Essentially, it did not align with the record and brought up more questions than it answered.

Rather than accepting the production at face value, we carefully examined the document. The metadata on the PDF revealed it was created after service of the discovery requests. The discrepancy could have reflected nothing more than when the document was scanned. It also could have reflected something more significant. So, we followed up.

We asked defense counsel for clarification on when the document was created and to produce the native file. Counsel refused. We then filed a motion to compel production of the native document. That motion forced the defendants to admit that the document had been created after the discovery requests were served. That explanation was inconsistent with prior sworn interrogatory responses. At that point, the case’s focus shifted from corporate structure to document authenticity.

We then moved for sanctions based on the creation of this evidence. Once the motion was pending, the defendants admitted that not one but 17 documents had been fabricated. One discrepancy in the metadata in a single document shifted the focus of the entire case. It was no longer about a “dispositive” legal issue; it was about the defendants’ vanishing credibility and shocking misconduct. We asked the court to strike the defendants’ answers and enter default judgment.

The summary judgment strategy that had originally cast a shadow over the case never materialized because the defendants’ dishonesty became the primary focus. The defendants called to discuss settlement while the sanctions motion was pending. The matter was resolved before any dispositive motion was filed and before the court ruled on the sanctions motion.

This outcome required significant attention to detail and tenacity. What ultimately changed the trajectory of the case was not a trial presentation but disciplined attention to detail in discovery.

The Legal Framework for Discovery Sanctions

Product liability cases like the ones we handle often must be filed in federal court.¹ Federal courts possess substantial authority to address discovery abuse. As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, a court has “broad discretion to control discovery.”²

That discretion is not abstract; it is grounded in specific rules and the court’s inherent authority. Each of these rules can be used to pursue discovery sanctions and police defendants’ bad conduct. The question of which rules to use depends on the specific discovery misconduct. This section outlines various sources for sanctions in federal court. These are not mutually exclusive — sanctions may be available under multiple rules for the same misconduct.

Rule 37(c): Failure to Disclose or Supplement

District courts have “broad authority under Rule 37 to control discovery, including dismissal as the most severe sanction.”³ “Rule 37 sanctions are imposed not only to prevent unfair prejudice to the litigants but also to [ensure] the integrity of the discovery process.”⁴

Rule 37(c)(1) authorizes courts, “[i]f a party fails to provide information … as required byRule 26(a) or (e)” to order payment of reasonable expenses, inform the jury of a party’s failure, or impose other appropriate sanctions, including those listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A). The rule operates in conjunction with Rule 26(e), which addresses a party’s obligation to supplement disclosures and discovery responses.

A failure to disclose warrants sanctions unless it was “substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). The burden rests on the non-disclosing party to demonstrate justification or harmlessness.⁵ Where sworn discovery responses conflict with later admissions, it becomes difficult to characterize the failure as harmless.

Rule 26(g): The Duty of Reasonable Inquiry

Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty on counsel to certify that discovery responses are complete and correct after a reasonable inquiry and not interposed for any improper purpose. The Advisory Committee Notes emphasize that the rule requires engagement in discovery “in a responsible manner” consistent with the spirit of Rules 26 through 37.

Courts have made clear that conducting a reasonable inquiry requires more than simply asking a client for documents. The Northern District of Georgia has described a mere superficial inquiry as the “litigatory equivalent of Russian roulette.”⁶ Defense counsel should take an active role in investigating the client’s discovery responses and production.

If a certification is made without substantial justification and in violation of Rule 26(g), the court must impose an appropriate sanction.⁷ “[D]oing the right thing upon discovery of documents does not erase a Rule 26(g) violation for failing to conduct a reasonable search in the first place.”⁸ The 1983 Advisory Committee Notes state that while “[t]he nature of the sanction is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised in light of the particular circumstances,” “Rule 26(g) makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it.”⁹

Rule 16(f)

Rule 16(f) authorizes sanctions where a party fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order. Sanctions under this rule are designed to address conduct that “unreasonably delays or otherwise interferes with the expeditious management of trial preparation.”¹⁰ Lesser sanctions may be imposed without a finding of willfulness or bad faith.¹¹ “[D]istrict courts have discretion to decide if there is a pattern of delay or a deliberate refusal to comply with court orders or directions that justifies a sanction.”¹²

Inherent Authority

Beyond the rules, courts possess inherent authority to impose “reasonable and appropriate” sanctions to manage their proceedings.¹³ That authority extends to sanctioning bad faith conduct, including actions that delay or disrupt litigation.¹⁴ “The key to unlocking a court’s inherent power is a finding of bad faith.”¹⁵ Bad faith may be inferred from the conduct before the court.¹⁶

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “false evidence is sufficient cause for sanctions.”¹⁷ It continued that “those ‘who lie, evade and fail to tell the whole truth obviously enjoy an advantage over honest litigants. The victimized opponent winds up … consuming substantial resources to respond to and ‘undo’ the victimizer’s lies and distortions.’”¹⁸ And, ultimately, it affirmed the ultimate sanction of striking the defendant’s answer.¹⁹

When Discovery Determines the Outcome

The lesson is not that every irregularity warrants a sanctions motion, nor is it that courts will impose the most severe penalties in every case. The rules provide a graduated set of remedies, and courts retain broad discretion in applying them. 

The fundamental point is that discovery is a credibility exercise. When defendants lie or mislead the court and delay discovery and litigation, the litigation landscape changes. Courts are empowered to address that conduct. Opposing parties must reassess the risk of moving forward.

In the case study discussed above, the decisive contest did not occur at trial. It unfolded through careful document review, measured motion practice, and invocation of the rules designed to protect the integrity of discovery. The metadata did not win the case on its own, but it revealed what trial preparation alone might never have uncovered.

Diligently reviewing discovery responses and productions and following up when there are gaps and discrepancies — whether in metadata, privilege logs, expert disclosures or written responses — can shift the trajectory of a case long before the trial begins. In most cases, dogged work in discovery often determines whether a trial occurs at all.

Sources:

1. Even if you don’t practice in federal court, state courts often look to federal case law on the issue of discovery abuses and sanctions. See e.g., Synovus Bank v. Peachtree Factory Ctr.,Inc., 331 Ga. App. 628, 630, 770 S.E.2d 887, 889 (2015) (“Because Georgia’s Civil Practice Actis modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, decisions of the federal courts interpreting the federal rules are persuasive authority”). Georgia courts also have similar discretion to sanction parties who break the rules and lie. Res. Life Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 304Ga. App. 719, 737, 698 S.E.2d 19, 34 (2010) (explaining that “[t]rial judges have broad discretion in controlling discovery, including imposition of sanctions” and affirming sanctions when defendant was sanctioned because of “its patently false discovery responses and its misrepresentations to the trial court.”). ↩︎
2. Phipps v. Blakeney, 8 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1993). ↩︎
3. Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). ↩︎
4. Aztec Steel Co. v. Fla. Steel Corp., 691 F.2d 480, 482 (11th Cir. 1982). ↩︎
5. Eckhardt v. United States, 2022 WL 16841587, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2022). ↩︎
6. Collins-Williams v. Contour Eastwyck LLC, No. 1:20-CV-3129-CAP, 2022 WL 17828934, at*92-93 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2022). ↩︎
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3). ↩︎
8. Venator v. Interstate Res., Inc., 2016 WL 1574090, at *9 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 2016). ↩︎
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) Advisory Committee Notes, 1983 amendments. ↩︎
10. Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985).  ↩︎
11. Andrews v. Autoliv Japan, Ltd., 2019 WL 13040493, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2019). ↩︎
12. United States v. Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). ↩︎
13. Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002). ↩︎
14. In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). ↩︎
15. Oniha v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 1:19-CV-05272-LMM, 2021 WL 4930127, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept.13, 2021), aff’d  ↩︎
16. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1125 (11th Cir. 2001). ↩︎
17. Forsberg v. Pefanis, 634 F. App’x 676, 680 (11th Cir. 2015). ↩︎
18. Id. ↩︎
19. Id. ↩︎